Kentucky Law Journal
Volume 25

Issue 3

Article 10

1937

Power of Appointment--Appointed Property as Assets of the
Donee
Charlie Tignor
University of Kentucky

Follow this and additional works at: https://uknowledge.uky.edu/klj
Part of the Property Law and Real Estate Commons

Right click to open a feedback form in a new tab to let us know how this document benefits you.
Recommended Citation
Tignor, Charlie (1937) "Power of Appointment--Appointed Property as Assets of the Donee," Kentucky Law
Journal: Vol. 25: Iss. 3, Article 10.
Available at: https://uknowledge.uky.edu/klj/vol25/iss3/10

This Note is brought to you for free and open access by the Law Journals at UKnowledge. It has been accepted for
inclusion in Kentucky Law Journal by an authorized editor of UKnowledge. For more information, please contact
UKnowledge@lsv.uky.edu.

STUDENT NOTES
making a special session of the legislature altogether unnecessary.
Even so under the decision of the Kentucky Court the legislature
would have to convene as the governor when he issued the call performed the last act he was authorized to perform.
Suppose the governor decides to issue a call for a special session
and accordingly has the proper proclamation drawn up and executes it.
Later in the day he learns that he had not been correctly informed
as to the true status of the matter for which the proclamation was to
issue and therefore decides not to issue the call. However, he leaves
the proclamation lying on his desk and his secretary, not being advised, sends the proclamation out. Can the governor revoke the call
here? Presumably not under the decision of the Kentucky Court.
The Kentucky Court, although they do not base their decision
upon It, present the theory that if the governor -was allowed to revoke the call, even though urgent reasons existed for such call, he
might be subjected to such pressure by interests that would be affected
thereby that he would cancel the call. This argument would be just as
effective the other way. That is the governor might be induced by
special interests to convene the legislature, and upon sane reflection
decide that a special session would be an unnecessary expense. However, this is all beside the point for if the power exists the fact that
it might be abused would not deprive the governor of the power.
Of course occasions for the exercise of such power seldom arise,
but there are many instances that could occur in which on the basis
of reason the governor should have such power, and it seems to me
that in many instances such power would be necessary for the governor to effectually carry out the power granted to him. The court
in arriving at the proper construction of a section of the constitution
must consider the reason for and the purpose of its adoptionU There
is no way of determining the purpose of the adoption of this provision
except through reasoning from the provision itself, but it should be
given a practical interpretation,- rather than an impracticable one.

C. D.
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POWER OF APPOINTMENT-APPOINTED PROPERTY AS
ASSETS OF THE DONEE
A devised Blackacre to B for life with an express provision giving
B a right to dispose of Blackacre by will. In the event B failed to
dispose of Blackacre by will A made other provisions for its disposition. B devised Blackacre to C for life with remainder to C's issue.
On her death B's creditors seek to subject Blackacre to the satisfaction
of their debts. In the case of St. Matthews Bank v. De Charette, the
Kentucky Court held that B's creditors had no claim to Blackacre,
even though B was given a general power of appointment by will and
had exercised that power in favor of volunteers, viz., C and C's issue.
1153 Ky. 604, 156 S. W. 154, 44 L. R. A., N. S. 989.
"234 Ky. 473, 28 S. W. (2d) 745.
1259 Ky. 802, 83 S. W. (2d) 471 (1935).
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The rule seems to be well settled that creditors of the donee of a
power of appointment by will cannot subject the property which is the
subject matter of the power to the payment of their debts, unless, first,
the donee's own property is insufficient, second, the power is general,
third, the power is exercised, and fourth, the power is exercised in
2
favor of volunteers. When all four of these elements are present the
cases are no longer so unanimously in accord. The great majority of
3
the courts favor the donee's creditors, while a few courts have departed from the beaten path and hold that the creditors of the donee
of a general power of appointment by will cannot subject the property to the payment of their debts, even though the donee has exer4
The Kentucky
cised the power in favor of persons not his creditors.
Court in the case noted above being unfettered by precedent, took
notice of this conflict of authority, and on principle sided with the
minority and against the donee's creditors.
Under a general power of appointment the donee of the power
may appoint to whomever he pleases. In fact he may appoint to himself.5 But as the power of appointment is by will the appointment
cannot take effect until death of the donee.
The theory of the majority rule allowing the donee's creditors to
reach the subject matter of the power is predicated upon the notion
that any person who has such power and control over property that
he may appoint to anyone he wishes as owner, even to himself, should
be considered the owner at least for some purposes. And any attempt
on the donee's part to dispose of the property to others is a fraud on
his creditors. It is said that the attempt by the donee to dispose of
the property by exercising the power, is exercising complete dominion
over it which is not inconsistent with ownership, and that equity
will then intervene and frustrate the transaction by seizing the prop8
The whole theory is based on the
erty for the benefit of creditors.
idea that a man is under a duty to pay his debts if he can, and if he
has the right and power to augment his estate by exercising the power
for his own benefit, he should do so.' The very minute the donee
2
Tuell v. Hurley, 206 Mass. 65, 91 N. E. 1013 (1910); Johnson v.
Cushing, 15 N. H. 298, 41 Am. Dec. 694 (1844); Gilman v. Bell, 99 Ill.
144 (1891); Bentham v. Smith, 15 S. C. Eq. (Cheves) 33, 34 Am. Dec.
599 (1840); Patterson v. Lawrence, 83 Ga. 703, 10 S. E. 355 (1889).
'Clapp v. Ingrahm, 126 Mass. 200 (1879); Forbes v. Snow, 245
Mass. 85, 140 N. E. 418 (1923); Crane v. Fidelity Union Trust Co., 99
N. J. Eq. 164, 133 A. 205 (1926); Freeman v. Butters, 94 Va. 406, 26
S. E. 845 (1879).
dRhode Island Hospital Trust Co. v. Anthony, 49 R. I. 339, 142 A.
531 (1928); Adger v. Kirk, 116 S. C. 298, 108 S. E. 97 (1920); Balls v.
Dampson, 69 Md. 390, 16 A- 16 (1888); Cutting v. Cutting, 86 N. Y.
522 (1881); Commonwealth v. Duffield, 12 Pa. 277 (1849) Dictum.
8
Clapp v. Ingrahm, note 3, supra.
OJohnson v. Cushing, note 2, supra.
7Hill v. Treasurer, 229 Mass. 474, 118 N. E. 891 (1918); Shattuck
v. Burrage, 229 Mass. 448, 118 N. E. 889 (1918).
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attempts to dispose of the property to anyone besides his creditors,
8
equity steps in and declares the transaction to be a fraud on them.
But Equity will not force the donee to exercise the power, hence, even
under the majority rule the donee may simply default in exercising
the power in which case the creditors are helpless. The chief reason
given for this requirement is that equity may cure the defective execution of a power but will not supply the failure to exercise it? The
courts recognize the fact that it is as great a moral fraud upon his
creditors for the donee of the power to fail to exercise it, as it is in
the case where he exercises it in favor of volunters," yet in the latter
case the subject matter of the power is turned over to creditors, while
in the former case the creditors get nothing. It would seem that if
the donee is to be treated as owner of the subject matter of the power
to such an extent that his creditors can reach it to satisfy their debts
when he attempts to turn the property over to his friends, he should
likewise be treated as the owner when he defaults in exercising the
power
The minority rule, which was followed by the Kentucky Court
in the principal case, is based upon the ground that the mere power
to dispose of property is not equivalent to its ownership. The property which is the subject of the power is not considered the donee's for
the purpose of succession and inheritance taxes;" it does not pass to
the donee's administrator on his death and it should not be considered
the donee's for the purpose of allowing his creditors to reach it. Title
to the property is never vested in the donee, but is transferred directly
from the donor of the power to the appointees.'
And finally it is
said that the intention of the donor is that the donee be given a right
to appoint the property to whomever he pleases, and that this intention of the donor is absolutely disregarded when equity intervenes and
declares that the donee must appoint to his creditors, if to anyone."
COAnnIE TrGoso.
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